THE REASONS OF THE SOMALI DEBACLE
HOW TO AVOID THAT GUNS AND FANATICISM
DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF SOMALIA

Rome 4 June 2009, Nino Sergi INTERSOS Secretary General

(Translation from original version in Italian)

Foreword
Somalia is a country where the situation can improve or worsen quickly. Today it is heading towards the worst: hundreds of thousands of people are fleeing the fight or are hit by shortages of food, water and healthcare. Do the conditions exist for a solution that can end instability and conflict that have characterized the country since 1991?

1. The International Community and Somalia
In few days, the 9th and 10th of June, the International Somalia Contact Group (ISCG), chaired by the Secretary General Special Representative for Somalia, Mr Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, will gather in Rome. Among the others the meeting will see the presence of high representatives from a number of International Organizations. Notably, the African Union (AU), the European Union (both the Commission and the Presidency), the Arab League, the Organisation of The Islamic Conference (OIC), the World Bank, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD). Moreover, a number of States will take part to the meeting, among the other: Italy, Tanzania, United States, Norway and Sweden. While the Somali President, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, will greet the audience.

The previous meeting in Rome was held the 10th of September 2007. In re-reading its final declaration one is struck by the absence of strong ideas that could prove effective in helping the country to break the vicious circle in which it was locked. And that was a time where the conditions seemed in place to achieve some success. At the time, the endless list of good auspices of the ISCG included: 'the acknowledgement of the improvements in security'; 'the expression of concern for the continuing situation of violence'; 'the welcoming of the commitment by the President A. Yusuf to pave the way for a political process that could reclaim the trust of the Somali population to the central state'; 'the underlining of the worsening of the humanitarian situation’. Moreover the group committed itself to: 'following with attention the development of political dialogue', 'inviting the federal institutions to elaborate a timetable that could envisage multi-party elections by 2009'. Finally, the group invited 'all the parties to renounce violence, to participate to the political dialogue and to rebuff the extremists'. The declarations of the subsequent meetings would have continued to broaden the list of auspices and acknowledgements, sometimes accompanying them with substantial financial commitments.

Re-reading these declarations while looking at the latest dramatic developments that are unfolding in front of us, raise the question about whether the main cause of the actual situation is the omissions, mistakes, delays of the International Community itself. The issue is bothersome, but is necessary to have the courage to pose this question. The Somalis and the Transitional Government of Somalia carry important responsibilities, but what is impressive today is the gap between the vision and the action of the International actors involved, that sometimes are self-satisfied by the official documents, and the evolving situation on the ground.

It was a duty of the UN, whose leadership had been acknowledged in Stockholm in October 2004, to guide and sustain the transitional process, and to strengthen the local, regional and central authorities. The two UN Representatives that have taken the responsibility of the process, despite their excellent credentials, have not been able to fulfil their mandate and to contribute to the solution of the problems that, on the other hand, have worsened. Despite some excellent initiatives, there have been too many delays, indecision, and mistakes in the assessments and in the decisions that have been taken. The same organisation that was endowed with this mandate, the UNPOS that is based in Nairobi (Kenya), with its 700-strong workforce, seems to be over-proportioned compared with the results achieved. Too many workshops and seminaries frequently held abroad, for Somali policy-makers and administrators while the country was clearly in need of something else.

Even the International Agencies that were in charge of strengthening the local institutions, have failed to deliver consistent results. Although some objective difficulties on the ground have contributed to the overall failure, many important occasions have been wasted at a time where windows of opportunity were open. Moreover, during the last months a strong support for the only two local administrations of Middle Shabelle and Hiran that have remained loyal to the new Government and the President was essential. Failure to do so has eased the spread of the Shabab, the young mujahedeen of Somalia.

As a result of the requests for dialogue with the opposition by the ISCG, and following the appointment of Nur Adde Hassan Hussein as Prime Minister, a process to achieve National Unity started in Gibuti in 2008. The process of national unity was made official the 9th of June 2008, under the auspices of the United Nations, and it resulted, the 31st of January 2009, in the appointment of President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed - and the formation of a new Government. As highlighted by recent events, this 'national unity' was perceived to be such by the International Community, rather than by all the Somalis. The authority of the new Government was limited only to some areas of Mogadishu and to two regions north of the Shabelle River, while the remaining parts of the country remained in the hands of those who continuously rejected this 'national unity'. As such, the new Government was enjoying external strength and legitimacy while internally it was extremely weak.

Moreover, the strength of the Shabab has been systematically under-estimated. This was despite the early warning signs that, after the killing of the militia leader Aden Hashi Ayro in an US missile attack the 1st of May 2008, a strong military campaign was undergoing. Kidnappings, killings and attacks against the International Agencies and NGOs have increased in number and intensity, while the progressive occupation of the territory was under-estimated and described as 'social criminality' by the Security Department of the UN. The process was further accelerated by the untimely declaration, after the international meeting convened in Brussels the 23rd of April, which announced the commitment of $215 million to strengthen the Somali security forces. This announcement has proven to be a major incentive for the fundamentalist opposition to launch the final attack.

On the other hand, in the last days the enforcement of measures to block airports and ports in rebel-controlled areas seems to be effective. In fact, given the importance of economic interests for all the warring parties, the negative effects of these measures on a number of business activities can result in the withdrawal of support for the rebel factions by relevant clans and businessmen. It is difficult to foresee the relevance of these trends; however, what can be noticed is that when there is political will to intervene there are instruments to do it, and in many cases these do not include the use of force that often ‘displace’ the problem without solving it.

2. The issue at stake: The soul of Somalia
Much has been said about the internal divisions of the Shabab and the other opposition parties. However, the unifying effect of religious fanaticism has been effective in downscaling internal debates, favouring a development from a tactical alliance (around February 2009) to a strategic unity that has resulted in the well-coordinated offensive from the 7th of May onwards. On the other hand the International Community has not undertaken either a major rethinking or acknowledgement of previous mistakes, nor the definition of a real strategy to strengthen the institutions which they intend to support, but only a “passing of the buck” regarding the request for a “major attention from the International Community”, which in this context has become an external entity to discharge direct responsibilities of the single States.

The 'community' that is behind the Shabab appears totally different. Firstly, these once 'young' mujahedeen are now grown up. Already, in 2005 with the new Transitional Institutions installed in Jowhar, Mogadishu was renowned for the many young, who were trained for military actions, in some cases while continuing their normal studies. It is consequently evident that the hardcore of the group was formed long ago. These youngsters have now become adults. They split into autonomous territorial and tribal groups, frequently clashing between them. They have been joined by a vast number of desperate young militiamen, who were born surrounded by weapons, and are available to undertake whatever action, including crimes, violence and pillage, in order to survive. They have their own 'international community’ to refer to. This ‘community’ sustains them, feeds their ideology, supplies them with weapons and has been able to tighten the ranks of the rebels allowing them to show, in few weeks, a degree of coherence evidenced in their attack against the Transitional Institutions. Some observers have reported that the number of foreigners among them amount to hundreds, and is on the rise. Between them are some Somalis of the diaspora that are coming back from Europe, America and the Middle East to support a rebellion against Institutions that they consider a mere mirror of foreign interests of States and of the UN, rather than genuinely committed to the well-being of the Somalis. Some of them are pushed by the frustration of years spent without seeing any significant result or improvement.

From the onset in 2004, the Somali Institutions lack a soul and values. They are the result of external and internal calculations, weights and counterweights, with policy-makers ready to split and fight whenever they see in interest in it. The sense of community and common good is overridden by greedy personal and family interests. Security should be ensured by a force that remains fragmented and unmotivated, and that should be trained and armed ideologically rather than with weapons. The relevance of traditional Islam has been under-estimated, while it represents the only unifying element that can contrast the inter-clan divisions. Islamic values and traditions contribute significantly today to gathering forces under the banner of 'Ahlu-l-Sunna wa-l-Jama’a' to limit the fundamentalist drift of the Shabab. There are some reliable personalities, including the President, the Prime Minister and some Ministers and Members of the Parliament, but they should be supported far more seriously, even by involving the healthy part of the civil society that in the last years have provided the population with answers and services that the central government has failed to supply. These efforts have not been undertaken in the past and are not being sufficiently undertaken at the moment.

Maybe it is not still clear that the struggle that is being fought is for the soul of Somalia itself. On one side are the 'real foreigners', armed with a nazi islamic ideology that wishes to substitute the funding values of the Somalis with a political and religious organisation that is not rooted in the Somali society. On the other side is a government that should defend the basic values of the clanic and religious traditions, but that has inherited the legacy of mistakes made by its predecessors and is identified with international partners that have contributed to these mistakes. This is not an issue that is destined to be limited to the Somali borders: what Somalia will be and the ways in which its future will be defined will have important repercussions in the region and abroad.

Is it still possible to leave this blind alley, after having unwittingly contributed, to putting Somalis one against another, by thinking that the democratic rule of majority could allow us to under-estimate a relevant minority, whose claims would have been better to hear with more attention? Not much imagination was needed to foresee that a solution that was not inclusive of the opposition forces, that at the time had a different political and unarmed agenda, would have proven difficult to implement despite the international backing it enjoyed.

Probably, some of the leaders of the opposition are also well aware that even if they will seize the power with guns, they will hardly be able to govern a country that will remain fragmented and in continuous conflict, only in the name of Islam.

But maybe this is not the aim of the fundamentalists. Maybe it has already been achieved by showing that the Federal Institutions do not have any autonomy and are totally dependent upon external backing. In Mogadishu they are supported by the African Union peacekeeping force (AMISOM), while in Belet Weyne, in the north, they are protected by the proximity of Ethiopian forces. By showing this weakness the rebels can justify, even by enjoying a certain amount of consensus, their continuous challenge to the federal authority and the destabilization of the state. This would be the worst scenario for Somalia.

Without underestimating what- good or bad- has been done to this point, the fundamental need would be to involve the opposition into the political process; thus excluding only those that are manifestly supportive of terrorism or qaedist practices, carefully, and not in a prejudicial and superficial way, as happened in the past. Hearing and considering the different proposals, to the limit of reasonableness, despite the political difficulties involved, is the approach that should have been followed, patiently, from the onset. This not only would have allowed for a better understanding of the rationale behind the proposals, but even to accept the meaningful requests while rejecting the others without necessarily breaking the dialogue. In sum a respectful dialogue without prejudicial dogmas. On the other hand, in the majority of cases the path chosen has been the easiest: of prejudice and exclusion, even when the reality was suggesting a different solution as in the case of the Union of the Islamic Courts in 2006. All of this was with the ideological background of the 'War on Terror' that, with its blindness, has contributed to generating terror where it was absent. In conclusion the path of dialogue should be resumed, whatever the difficulties, even if someone considers this impossible.

3. 'The worst humanitarian crisis in Africa'
This is the definition given by the UN Secretary General Ban-Ki-Moon already one year ago. This assessment is confirmed by all the Humanitarian Organizations that are operating in Somalia. More than three million Somalis, with an increase of 80% from 2007, are suffering today as a consequence of the conflict. These include the vicious circle of violence and insecurity, and the cyclical drought that produces famine and kills the cattle. Initially the armed clashes had their centre in Mogadishu, from which almost half the population fled from the beginning of 2007, and then they have expanded to the centre-south of the country for half of 2008. The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have sought shelter outside the capital, in particular on the roads that connect it with Afgoye, while others have returned to their regions of origin that were already stricken with drought. Some of them attempted to return to Mogadishu hoping for a more peaceful period after the formation of the Government of National Unity, but the clashes resumed in early May, resulting in 70 thousand new displacements in a few weeks. Those that are unable to move are the poor, who live on nothing. Poverty and insecurity, hunger, the lack of water resources and healthcare- the difficulties in survival are seriously hitting the population. One child out of six under the age of five, in particular in the centre-south of the country, is seriously undernourished and is at risk to die. No more than 15% of the population has access to basic healthcare. Around 500 thousand people have found shelter in other countries. The refugee camps in Kenya and Yemen have grown month after month despite the tighter checks at the border, and thousands have died in the Gulf of Aden.

The crisis does not enjoy media support. There are not TV journalists or testimonials as in 1991-1992, even though the actual situation is at risk to deteriorate to the point of those tragic years.

The attention and the engagement of the International Community to face the Humanitarian Crisis remains dramatically insufficient. The Somali and International NGOs have asked for an increase in funds and attention, denouncing the seriousness of the situation. However, it is crucial to highlight the responsibilities of the Somalis themselves, including the violations perpetrated by the authorities themselves that have intimidated and harassed their own citizens, while the bandits were ready to self-enrich at the expenses of those unable to defend themselves by buying protection. The same humanitarian access to the population in need is often difficult and insecure, characterized by armed clashes, roadblocks, stealing, that can peak at the point of killings and kidnappings of the same humanitarian personnel who attempt to provide relief.

The decision to leave Somalia has been taken too early and too quickly. The truth is that since the 1990s only a small number of International Organizations have established their Headquarters in the country, rather preferring the more stable and secure Nairobi; thus, forcing all the actors on the ground to refer to institutions outside the country. This was the case even before May 2008 when, after the killing of the Shabab leader Aden Hashi Ayro, the offensive against everything that could be linked with the West started.

Up to that date many occasions have been wasted. It is evident that it is not the same to support a country from 2000km away, or while living in it siding with the local populations and institutions. But priority has been given to Nairobi, to the needs of the wide international presence and its countless meetings. The remote management of projects has become the rule for many of them.

The work of the International Community has indubitably been 'for', but only rarely it has been developed 'with' the recipients. Where implemented, this partnership could have given to the action the added value that may have contributed to a different overall outcome. It is consequently important to praise that Humanitarian Agencies and NGOs that, where possible, have tried to stick with their mandate. These are the ones that, while providing aid, have shown the will to share the difficulties with the local population and institutions. It is important as well to praise the Somali NGOs and other actors that, often carrying a risk, have shown dedication and commitment towards those in need, frequently struggling with the profit-seekers and exposing themselves to dangerous situations.

The phenomenon of the so-called 'donor’s fatigue' has been characterizing Somalia for a long time. This mean an overall reduction of aid flows even if, luckily, some major donors- notably the European Union- are fulfilling and renewing their commitments. However, the trend towards a scaled-down engagement determined by distrust and objective difficulties is real and is at risk of worsening. This is even because the international engagement is today focused on the issue of piracy, to the point that for some the Somali problem is read only through security lenses distorted by commercial interests. The perverse rationale behind this is that it can be possible to separate the issue of piracy from the lack of opportunities for thousands of young Somalis, and from the drought and shortages that hit the northeast of the country.

Concerning piracy it is good to highlight that the extension of this phenomenon is another example of missed opportunities, under-estimations, and superficiality in assessing the issues at the onset in order to give a quick and more effective response. The underestimation and delay in fighting it is evidenced by the fact that the first request in this sense came from the Prime Minister Ali Ghedi already three years ago. These mistakes have been brought to a present point in which the connections and ramifications of the issue are far wider, and the extent of the engagement necessary to fight it is higher than the one needed at the onset, when the first early warning signs were detected.

It will be a grievous mistake not to answer to the concrete needs of the population, frequently connected with issues of survival. But together with food, water and healthcare there are other long-term needs such as education, vocational training, agricultural production, breeding, and microcredit to start up enterprises. Failure to do so would not only imply a second fiasco of the International Community, but even the implicit decision to leave the country in the hands of the higher bidder, as it is already partially happening. The consequences of these decisions can be easily envisaged.

4. What can be done?
Which are the keys to break this deadlock? We will highlight here some of the possible solutions that directly involve the International Community and the ISCG itself.
Ethiopia has always been seen as the enemy power, interested in the stability or instability of Somalia only as a consequence of its own internal and external interests. Consequently, in this phase, Ethiopia cannot be involved in the process in Somalia, and having done so in the past was a mistake. The arbitrary military occupation of the 24th December 2006, against the will of the Resolution 1725 of the Security Council, and the inhumane attitude of the Ethiopian forces deployed in Somalia, have strengthened the mistrust of the Somalis towards their neighbour. Moreover the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict has a direct influence on Somalia. Its resolution, following the decision of the Boundary Commission of 2002 that has been recognized but not implemented, could contribute not only to pacification between these two countries but even to stabilize Somalia. Eritrea, which is fighting its war against Ethiopia, even by using Somalia as a proxy, by sustaining the rebel groups and, maybe, supplying them with weapons, is a crucial actor in continuing the patterns of instability and war. A renewed and strong engagement towards the resolution of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict should become a priority for the ISCG, by seizing every possible opportunity to move in this direction, even when this implies re-discussing consolidated geopolitical partnerships. It would be positive to table the issue of Somalia in the Agenda of the next G8, even only as an indication of attention in order to set a priority on which working in the subsequent months. This would be an important political sign for the entire Horn of Africa- a sign that there is a real resolve to engage in the issues to contribute to ending the causes of instability and impoverishment of those countries, and favour a new framework of peace, regional cooperation and development. Only if the solution of the Eritrea-Ethiopia issue is achieved will be fully possible for the IGAD to work and for the African Union to throw its political weight in the area.

On the internal situation it is extremely difficult to make any forecast given the progressive deterioration that has determined the wielding of the once divided oppositions. If only some weeks ago it was possible to tell that only a small amount of leaders were connected with qaedist groups, today this is maybe not true anymore.
Divisions among the different Shabab groups and between them and the Hisbul Islam, the Islamic party, are nowadays downgraded thanks to the unifying force of warring Salafism and the hatred towards the institutions 'imposed by the foreigners', against which it is essential to fight. However less relevant, these divisions should not be forgotten. Both inside the Shabab and the Hisbul Islam there are differences between fundamentalists positions, connected with international terrorism, and others more political and with nationalist goals. The latter should receive more attention before they will disappear as a consequence of the developments on the ground. Understanding their goals and rationale is essential, unless the will is to rely once more on the use of force. In this case, the result would be to create a second Afghanistan, to radicalise the conflict and prolong the sufferance of the population.

One of these positions was aiming at a political solution, entirely Somali, not driven or imposed from abroad. The proposal was to gather a national conference among Somalis that, at an equal level and without external interferences, could find a solution ‘totally internal and as such a final one, because all the suggestions coming from abroad had proven to be untenable’. The rationale behind this position is that previous solutions have always favoured some factions against others, thus contributing to strengthening divisions in order to answer to interests different from the Somali ones. This purely nationalistic position, although unrealistic, is legitimate and should be taken into account in order to sustain the residual Somali national pride that, in the last years, has almost disappeared as a consequence of the idea that the solution to Somali problems would have always come from abroad. Where translated into action this position rejects the interference of Ethiopia, given the history of conflict between the two countries and the subordination of the IGAD and AU to the powerful neighbour. As a consequence, it rebuffs any Ethiopic or AU military presence that is considered as partial. Moreover, the backers of this national plan highlight the shortcomings of the International Community, which has proven to be unable to understand the Somali reality and the developments on the ground, as a consequence of entrenched political and religious prejudices. Furthermore, the International Community has been unable to cease the hostilities and sustain a genuine peace process, alleviate sufferance and provide relief to people in despair. Finally, this position rejects the Gibuti process, considered as the result of divisions and compromises. Clearly there is no reference to the rejection of Eritrean interference as this is understandable.

It can be sustained that it would be naïve to believe in the possibility of a genuine national conference, deprived of any external influence. However, if these kinds of national positions, that have enjoyed the continuous support of the ARS and Hisbul Islam, are not taken into consideration, the only other option is a relapse into armed conflict. These are political options that can be difficult to accept, or that can appear rather simplistic, primarily because they advocate a will of shifting from the patterns of external interference. However, they cannot be rejected without careful consideration. In order to make peace one has to talk with the opponent at one point. This would imply taking into consideration the other’s ideas and positions. This has not been always attempted in the past, on other similar occasions. This was a mistake that has been only partially mended and only with extreme delay. It would be better not to perpetuate the mistakes in the future. No political option should be taken off the table, even when it could potentially result in ‘unthinkable’ or ‘impossible’ solutions. The risk otherwise is to perpetuate the vicious circle of violence and insecurity, and to strengthen fundamentalist tendencies.

The duty of the Transitional Institutions is now to bring the country towards a final phase of stabilization and peace. This is a difficult and challenging goal. The transitional process should aim to create new institutions, involving those actors that until today have been strangers. All extremist groups, those that ground their action on disrespect and annihilation of the others, must be isolated and defeated but all the actors have to review their agendas that often were totally detached from the reality of the ground, and contrasting with Somali interests. By implementing this process on renewed bases of parity and reciprocity, by Somalis and between Somalis, both those in the country and the Diaspora, the institutions will be strengthened and will enjoy credibility. Will this be ever possible?

The International Community should do more, with more commitment. Piracy is only one of the elements to be taken into account, and certainly not the first. It has to show attention, interest and commitment towards the country, its population and its problems. But what will be also needed is a ‘step back’, even forcing Eritrea and Ethiopia to do the same. The political initiative should be left to the Somalis, they have to be trusted and backed forcefully, without direct interference, even if the solutions will be diverging with expectations and immediate geopolitical interests. Will this be ever possible?

5. Italy and its possible role
Given her historical linkages Italy is still considered, both in Somalia and at the international level as an important country in the process. Her knowledge of the local situation and the wide array of opportunities for dialogue and mediation, are considered useful both regarding internal relations in Somalia, and at a regional level. As a consequence, dealing with the Somali issue is a duty for Italy. However, this duty has been ignored or taken superficially for a long time. It has been more based on the goodwill of single persons, rather than on a clear and coherent political decision. ‘Italians have been our tutors, but in the most difficult moment have left us alone. Today we only receive invitations to reconcile that remain at a lip-service level. If Italy was to show a more serious and continuous commitment, things could have evolved differently’. This is a comment from 2005, but is frequently heard in the country.

On the other hand the historical ties have resulted in Somalis looking shelter and security in our country. This is why the majority of refugees in Italy are coming from the Horn of Africa, and from Somalia in particular.

Although in the last years the Ministry for Foreign affairs has tried to sustain the difficult process of transition, a coordinated action at ministerial level was lacking, as well as the translation of the support in reliable commitments to be implemented through actions of aid and cooperation, institution building, aimed at answering to the needs of the local population. The progressive cuts of the budget for International Development have further contributed to the problem, even by virtually impeding any action of planning.
The Special Envoy for Somalia, Mario Raffaelli, appointed six years ago in the occasion of the Peace Conference and reconfirmed until January 2009, has certainly contributed to strengthen the position of our country by showing competence and assertiveness. Having abolished this position risks to dampen the already weak Italian action. However, it is to be underlined that despite this risk, the last months have seen positive developments in the relations between Italy and Somalia, as recognized by the same Somali institutions.

The Italian Foreign Minister, Franco frattini has taken a stance of full support for the new federal institutions, but has always underlined the importance of a broader consensus that can include the opposition forces. This is a position in continuity with that of the Special Envoy, but that, thanks to the explicit commitment of the Minister, acquires a higher political relevance. However it is still impossible to assess if there are relevant initiatives to follow up this pronouncement. The Cooperation is an important tool for dialogue, but the actual position of the Ministry has assumed a ‘defensive’ stance as a consequence of the security concerns.

The Minister has further facilitated, in a difficult moment for Somalia, the meeting of the ICGS in Rome, inviting for the occasion the same Somali President, thus showing at the onset of the G8 the will to confirm the Italian interest for Somalia. The hope is now that from this meeting some creative solutions will be put forward, in order to answer to the actual crisis. Moreover it would be important if this meeting will be able to put the wider regional dimension of the problem on the G8 agenda as a commitment for the coming months.

Finally, Mr Frattini has ordered a new flight with medicines and emergency materials to resupply the hospitals of Mogadishu. Although this initiative was uncoordinated with the other actions that Italy is already undertaken, it was an important sign in a moment in which the population is particularly affected by the fights. What is of particular political significance is that the medicines are directed, under the guarantee of the Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, to the hospital of Daynile, situated in an area of Mogadishu under the control of the Shabab.

Italy has coordinated its actions with the European Union, and this is laudable. Europe could have played a more important role in Somalia, even considering the large amount of funds committed by Brussels for humanitarian aid, basic services, reconstruction, and security. Europe should have acted with a single voice, but at least at first place, the discordant positions of Member Countries have surfaced and the different European Presidencies, every six months, have not always favoured the creation of a coherent and strong pressure to achieve political aims. A plenipotentiary envoy of the European Union for Somalia would have been needed in order to speak with a single voice from the onset. A change in this field would be welcomed.

Conclusion
Everything is to be attempted in order to avoid that only guns and fanaticism determine the future of Somalia. But a deep commitment is needed, and consequential actions required, even where it means following new creative paths, in contrast with a past overburdened with failures.

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